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The Jena Six and Black Punishment:                 
Law and Raw Life in the Domain of Nonexistence 
Donald F. Tibbs1 & Tryon P. Woods2 
 
[W]e must firmly place ourselves in another space to describe our 
age, the age and space of raw life . . . .  It is a place where life and 
death are so entangled that it is no longer possible to distinguish 
them, or to say what is on the side of the shadow or its obverse.  
                  —Achille Mbembe 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The welcome sign at the entrance to Jena, Louisiana, describes it as “a 
nice place to call home.”3  Recent events involving its criminal justice 
system, however, produce a counternarrative at the intersection of race and 
law that refutes this slogan.  Trouble in Jena arose in September 2006 over 
the contestation of race and space when a black student named Kenneth 
Purvis asked Jena High School authorities for permission to sit under the 
“white tree,” a de facto segregated gathering place exclusively occupied by 
white students during school breaks.  The school principal informed Purvis 
that he could sit wherever he pleased, and along with two of his buddies, the 
young man did just that.4  The following morning, the student body arrived 
to find three nooses, painted black, dangling from the tree. 
Shortly afterwards, white District Attorney J. Walters Reed accompanied 
several police officers to address a Jena High School assembly.  In a 
throwback to the days of Bull Connor, he threatened the black students for 
protesting and “making a fuss about this innocent prank,” claiming that he 
could be their “best friend or worst enemy.”5  Next he informed the black 
students, “With the stroke of my pen, I can make your lives disappear.”6  
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Joiner provided the students with a didactic lesson in the history of race and 
law in America: blacks are more likely to be victimized by state violence 
than they are to be recipients of equal protection from the rule of law.7  The 
school was put on lockdown for the remainder of the week.   
Later that fall, on November 30, 2006, a fire burned down the main 
academic building of Jena High School.  The next evening, December 1, 
2006, a black student possessing a printed invitation to a white party was 
beaten up, and on December 2, 2006, Matt Windham, a young white man, 
pulled out a shotgun in a confrontation with several black youth at a local 
convenience store.  When the black youth defended themselves and seized 
the gun, they were arrested for theft of a firearm,8 second-degree robbery,9 
and conspiracy10 to commit second-degree robbery.  No charges were filed 
against the white man.11 
Finally, on December 4, 2006, at Jena High School, a white student 
named Justin Barker—who allegedly was making racial taunts, including 
calling the African American students “niggers” and supporting the white 
students who hung the nooses and beat up the black student off-campus—
was knocked down, punched, and kicked by six black students.12  The white 
provocateur was taken to the hospital, treated, and released with minor 
bruises.  He attended a social function that evening. 
All six black teens were charged with attempted second-degree murder, a 
charge that was later determined to be unsubstantiated according to the 
Louisiana Criminal Code.13  Amidst controversy, Prosecutor Reed reduced 
the charges to aggravated second-degree battery14 and conspiracy to 
commit aggravated second-degree battery.15  Under Louisiana criminal law, 
the aggravated charge requires the use of a weapon.  Prosecutor Walters 
argued the tennis shoes worn by Mychal Bell, one of the black teens, and 
used to kick Barker constituted the dangerous weapons, an argument the 
jury ultimately accepted.16  
At trial, the system continued to exact its violence.  Public defender 
Blane Williams, himself a black man, not only encouraged Bell to accept a 
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plea for a crime that was unsubstantiated by the facts of the case, but he 
failed to perform his duties as a zealous advocate for his client.17  Williams 
failed to challenge the all-white jury composition18 and rested the defense 
without offering any evidence or calling a single witness.19 The jury 
deliberated less than three hours and returned a conviction for Mychal 
Bell.20  Edna Thompson, a long-time friend of the Bells, summed up the 
jury’s decision: “The best thing if you’re black in this town is to stay out of 
the system, because once they get you, you’re done for.  You’re not getting 
out.”21  Public outrage, protests, and rallies helped provoke judicial review, 
which overturned the conviction on the grounds that Bell should have been 
tried as a juvenile since he was sixteen at the time of his arrest.22  On 
December 3, 2007, Bell pled guilty to a reduced charge of battery and was 
sentenced to eighteen months in a juvenile facility.  The cases of the 
remaining five youth, four of whom were over seventeen at the time of the 
incident—legal adults in Louisiana—are still pending.   
These six lives remain suspended in what we are characterizing here as 
the legal proceedings of “raw life.”  To live in the era of raw life is to 
occupy the crossroads of life and death.  The interlocking of life and death 
signals the entanglement of past, present, and future.23  Professor Cornel 
West, in characterizing the United States in the twenty-first century as a 
“twilight civilization” replete with “pervasive cultural decay” and the 
“dangerous rumblings” of the stigmatized, policed, and degraded Others, 
illuminates the retrograde direction of this society at the very moment of its 
most powerful ascendancy.24  For the postcolonial theorist Achille 
Mbembe, this emergent temporal context—the time of black suffering—is 
marked by a future horizon that is apparently closed, while the past appears 
to have receded.  Ours is thus a “time of entanglement,” a space “where life 
and death are so entangled that it is no longer possible to distinguish them”: 
the age of raw life.25  The interlocking of past and present can be seen in 
Jena in the scene of lynching nooses at integrated schools; in the form of 
racialized punishment in the era of formal legal equality; and, pointedly, in 
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the ability of a prosecutor to take away a child’s life “with the stroke of a 
pen.” 
Over the course of the next three parts of this article, we trace the origins 
and development of raw life.  From this vantage point, the form of power 
operative in our contemporary prison regime is embodied in the desire of 
whites to literally consume the bodies of racialized Others.  The history of 
colonization is replete with records of Europeans literally carving, cooking, 
and using the bodies of indigenous Africans and Americans.26  The history 
of North American slavery further demonstrates how modern idioms of 
power are vested in the fungibility of black bodies—their usefulness for the 
whims and purposes of whites.  Our objective here, then, is to closely 
examine how the state-sanctioned control of the black body from slavery to 
the contemporary prison regime—an analysis that usually remains at the 
level of analogy, that the criminal justice system today is like the slavery of 
yesterday—illumines just how intimately the past structures contemporary 
struggles.  
Part I, the “Ethics of Parasitic Pleasure,” reaches back to slavery, the 
institution through which white desires were given expression and defined 
value in terms of bodily sovereignty: whites attract honor, respect, and 
power—value—by virtue of not simply possessing their own bodies, but 
through their ability to accumulate black bodies as their pleasure-things.  
We use this socio-legal lens in order to relate the prosecutions in Jena to the 
formation of the modern Western world and its production of value.  
Conversely, blacks entered the modern Western world as devalued human 
beings.  So, too, did the six young boys arrested and charged in the Jena 
case. 
Part II uses the slave codes of the antebellum era to establish the 
fraudulent ethics surrounding the “rule of law” in the Jena case.  The law 
manifests this fraud in a number of ways worth recounting here.  The rule of 
law presupposes that its subjects have given their consent to being 
governed, which merely mystifies the reality of captivity, torture, mayhem, 
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and the requirement of total submission for blacks.  At the same time, the 
law decriminalized the white violence that was essential in holding together 
the nascent bourgeois democracy.  This legal regime also buttressed the 
moral authority claimed by the ruling class; for decades white violence was 
cloaked in morality.  Yet after the point when such violence became a sign 
of immorality, the violence did not cease; rather, it became the basis for the 
fraudulent ethics of white civil society today.  This “ethics of fraud,” as we 
refer to it, helps us understand how Jena unfolded through a legal framing 
of black criminality versus white innocence—how every act by the black 
teens was a punishable legal offense, while the white teens violated the law 
and black bodily sovereignty, with impunity.  
Part III uses the post–Emancipation era to reiterate the point that no 
transcendent moment altered the paradigmatic relation of the black body to 
the idiom of power that blacks lived under prior to 1865.27  Gratuitous and 
irrational violence continued to capture the black body during the era of 
lynching.  Our review of this period contributes a crucial dimension to our 
understanding of Jena.  Lynchings teach us that policing blackness provides 
indispensable social cohesion for white civil society; that decriminalized 
white violence is the mechanism by which this community is forged; and 
therefore that impunity by the police and the ability of whites to ignore this 
antiblack violence are the marks of a deeper white solidarity that goes 
beyond differences in region, class, creed, or political affiliation.  Part IV 
concludes with a brief but critical discussion of why the Jena case is 
fundamental to understanding how white supremacy is so deeply engrained 
in U.S. culture, in that it not only continues to inform the intrinsic political 
and psychic structures of this society, but its de facto legality presents little 
room in which to construct an alternate reality. 
The Jena Six case emerges from a legal regime with a particular history 
of perversion regarding the lives of African Americans.  Dating back to the 
slave codes of the South28 and progressing through the Fugitive Slave Acts 
of 1793 and 1850 (which often exacted harsher punishment than plantation 
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justice itself)29 to several landmark legal decisions such as Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896)30 and Pace v. Alabama (1883),31 the law has continuously 
guaranteed black suffering in terms of black people’s status as negated 
subjects.  In the well-known words of Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in the 
Dred Scott v. Sanford decision, the Negro was so far inferior that his 
reduction to slavery was not only “to his benefit” but also that he had “no 
rights that the white man was bound to respect.”32   
This article proffers an analysis of the Jena Six grounded in this historical 
context, going beyond mere acknowledgment of the debts that our present-
day criminal justice system owes to the institution of slavery to approach an 
assessment of the violence blacks regularly face in the law, an encounter 
almost so mundane it escapes representation.  A wide range of scholars 
have well documented that the U.S. ruling class crafted the contemporary 
U.S. prison regime as a replacement for the system of chattel slavery.33  
This legacy can be seen in our nation’s jails and prisons.34  As significant 
scholarship suggests, the Jena Six assumes its place within slavery’s 
modern legacy.    
How can we move beyond the limits of analogy?  The Jena Six is much 
more complex than a metaphor can convey: What does it mean to be, in the 
words of Frantz Fanon, “an object in the midst of other objects,”35 to live in 
“the domain of non-existence?”36  Born and raised in the French Caribbean 
colony of Martinique and later educated as a psychiatrist in Lyon, Fanon 
became an authority on how white supremacy renders the humanity of the 
colonized subject invisible.  When he served as the head clinician at a 
psychiatric hospital in French-occupied Algeria during the mid-1950s, 
Fanon came to the realization that the Western discourse on man and 
civilization—whether in philosophy or medicine—literally expunged the 
black from existence.  For Fanon, therefore, what it means to be “an object 
in the midst of other objects,” to not be seen as a human being but instead 
objectified as if he were a chair or a log, is a question that is 
unapproachable: it exceeds the limits of representation.37   
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What Fanon means by this formulation, and why his insight matters for 
our purposes here, is that proper recognition of the problem before us is 
always and already circumscribed by the language we have available to us 
with which to identify our injuries.  Insofar as the law establishes how we 
name and remedy injustice, it sets out the language in which we must locate 
our selves.  The problem of race, however, cannot be adequately understood 
through the language of law.  In this way, analyzing the Jena case—and 
other mundane operations of white supremacy—necessitates deconstructing 
law itself as a racial project in which black existence has been 
systematically occluded.  A major reason for the difficulty in getting close 
enough to the problem of racial injustice in the law to offer a just response 
to it is what we have referred to as the entanglements of raw life.  The task 
before us, therefore, is to lay out the ways in which the age of raw life 
retains the depths of earlier eras: a contingent existence that reveals itself 
through the guise of legal life and the stark horror of premature death.38   
Our discussion is neither about the legal aspects of the Jena Six case, nor 
about the six young men whose lives have been irreparably damaged.39  
The former has been well vetted in domestic and international legal 
discussions, and while a rich treatment of the latter has yet to be done, it 
remains beyond the scope of this article.40  Instead, we examine the socio-
legal context that produces the events in Jena and analyze how those events 
represent a moment of truth in what we refer to as “racial ordinariness”: 
defined as another instance in the historically invariant punishment of black 
people, a banal spectacle that gives us the occasion to put black experience 
at the center of our analysis of U.S. legal regimes.   
Reviewing the history of the black experience before the law clearly 
demonstrates that the Jena Six case is anything but unprecedented.  U.S. 
history features a consistent storyline regarding blacks and the law, largely 
undeviated from—one which historian Mary Frances Berry referred to as 
“black resistance [to] white law.”41  Berry reminds us that “[w]hether its 
policy was action or inaction, the national government has used the 
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Constitution in such a way as to make law the instrument for maintaining a 
racist status quo.”42  The Jena Six case joins this long history of 
constitutional spectacles—moments where the law is revealed not as the 
protector of minority rights, as liberal historiographers and philosophers 
would have us believe43—as a manifestation of civil society’s commitment 
to not only maintain white dominance in economic, political, social, and 
military matters, but to effectuate blackness as the most trod-upon station in 
society. 
While the popular conception of Jena is one of racist excess—of racism 
corrupting the otherwise fair process of justice—to conceptualize it as such 
obscures the mundane reality of black punishment.  In other words, 
recounting the history of crimes against constitutionality, as numerous race 
scholars and historians such as Berry and Derrick Bell have already done, 
produces the necessary conditions for arguing the banality of the Jena Six 
case.44  But it cannot provide the sufficient grounds for gaining traction on 
what white supremacy means to the U.S. legal regime.  Whenever one 
attempts to speak about the rules of race and power, one is forced back into 
a discussion of spectacular events—high-profile legal battles such as the 
Jena Six, for instance.45  The problem is that the spectacular actually 
camouflages the routine, the normal operation of the law against blacks in 
all its everyday terror and contempt, its misbehavior and broken ethicality.  
In other words, what is at issue is not that Jena has become a high-profile 
historical event, but rather that the kind of legal and social punishment of 
blacks that took place in Jena typifies the everyday practice of criminal law 
and its endorsement by white civil society throughout the nation. 
When it comes to everyday life, the secret of the law, hidden in plain 
sight, is that there is no recourse to the disruption of black life by the 
mundane violence of living in a white supremacist society.  The annals of 
contemporary legalized violence against black bodies are indeed 
spectacular, and the readily available examples merely hint at the terror 
defining black existence before the law: from the police beatings of Rodney 
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King or Oletha Waugh,46 the torture of Abner Louima,47 the killing of 
Amadou Diallo,48 the violent deaths of Malice Green49 and Johnny 
Gammage,50 to the recent shooting of Sean Bell on his wedding day.51  
From the analytic vantage point of raw life, the racial violence of legal 
doctrine is also alive and well.  The volatility of numerous Reconstruction 
era cases, briefly mentioned earlier, entangles with contemporary cases such 
as Wilson v. State52 and Lewis v. Casey.53  The numerous black men 
exonerated by DNA evidence and freed from prison through the Innocence 
Project, the prosecutors and District Attorneys who steadfastly maintain 
these men’s guilt despite the irrefutable scientific evidence, and the 
numerous anonymous men and women condemned prior to the recent era of 
technological advances in forensic criminology—these are the signs of raw 
life in the domain of nonexistence.54   
To focus on any one of these spectacles is to deploy, and thereby 
reaffirm, the logic of the law itself.  Documenting the law’s excesses, in an 
attempt to explain the paradigm of white supremacist violence, merely 
renders it nonparadigmatic, and reduces it to the fraudulent ethics on which 
the law bases its ongoing hegemony.  What makes the spectacle 
“spectacular” is precisely that the essential logic of the law remains 
unshaken.  Such discrete examples cannot represent the spectrum in which 
this paradigm manifests today—what might be called the “paradigm of 
policing”55—from the explicit violence of police homicides to the more 
subtle violence of the Jena Six case and the faceless millions held captive 
by the prison industrial complex.  This violence against the black body is 
structural and foundational to U.S. society—not contingent or excessive—
and it is this banal but essential quality to racism that the spectacular 
examples render unrecognizable.   
The objective of this article, therefore, is to take the Jena Six case and 
examine it not in terms of its excessiveness, but in terms of its ordinariness.  
Full interrogation and complete understanding requires examining how the 
law itself has evolved through the state’s relationship to captive black 
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bodies.  The law is not merely a mechanism for maintaining a racist status 
quo.56  On the contrary, the law is itself constituted through state violence 
against blacks, from slavery to our present-day prison regime.  The point to 
be examined here is historical and socio-legal in the sense that such an 
inquiry requires situating our particular spectacle—the Jena Six—at the 
locus of power created through the conjoined forces of the modern state, 
law, and race.  As Fanon called for, however, this kind of analysis 
necessarily takes us beyond the law, beyond the political economy of 
inequality, and into the symbolic economy that produces the meaning of 
racialized bodies in the first place.  We suggest that it is at these final 
levels—the problem of existence, or as W. E. B. DuBois put it, “what it 
means to be a problem”—that the spectacle of Jena can be grasped finally, 
not in terms of an instance of excess, but rather as precisely another 
moment in the invidious ethos of legalized terror that characterizes black 
suffering in the age of raw life, and constitutes the vernacular for everything 
in this society.57 
I.  JENA AND THE ETHICS OF PARASITIC PLEASURE 
 
There is a quest for the Negro, the Negro is in demand, one cannot 
get along without him, he is needed, but only if he is made 
palatable in a certain way.  Unfortunately, the Negro knocks down 
the system and breaks the treaties. 
                    —W.E.B. Du Bois 
 
Slavery is the indispensable starting point for our inquiry into the kind of 
state violence that produced the Jena spectacle because it is at this historical 
juncture that three central tropes of Western society—freedom, the 
individual, and private property—come together in the form of the law.  
These particularly Eurocentric concepts indicate a shift in power from the 
premodern era, globally speaking, but specifically for the experiences of 
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black people.  Slavery was the occasion for a transition from a system of 
property in which “a right to things [is] realized through a hold on persons” 
to one in which “a hold on persons [is] realized through a right to things.”58  
In Western culture, freedom came to mean full ownership of property rights 
in oneself.  This new idiom of power meant that the basic unit of the 
expansionist societies of Europe in the early modern period was the 
individual.  The concept of rights, including rights to the labor of oneself 
and others, being vested in the individual, is rightly described as “the 
peculiar institution,” given its youth with respect to the long history in 
human civilization of slavery and other bonded relations.59  The institution 
of waged labor and the legal regime in which worker and employer related 
to each other as autonomous agents, then, was just as peculiar to the African 
and indigenous societies that provided the slave laborers as plantation 
slavery was to these societies.   
The scope that the relationship between citizen and the state permitted for 
the individual points to the severe contingency of rights.  In their very 
formulation, rights are relative to their social recognition and institution: 
subjects possess rights only insofar as they are imbued with value by the 
social and political systems in which they exist.  The social construction of 
a right is beholden to the prevailing ideologies in which the civil system is 
based.  Europe’s emergent Enlightenment philosophers, for example, 
defined humanity in relationship to reason: to be human meant to possess 
the capacity for rational thought.60  Committed as they were to moral 
notions of equality and autonomy, Enlightenment philosophers avoided 
inconsistency by justifying racialized and gendered subordination; this 
involved denying the rational capacity of women, Africans, and other 
subaltern peoples.61  With subaltern humanity circumscribed in this way, 
enslavement, colonization, and discrimination became not only acceptable, 
but the moral imperative of a civilized people.  For instance, John Stuart 
Mill, one of Europe’s most prominent political philosophers, was a 
committed proponent of England’s colonization of India during the 
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nineteenth century on the grounds that it advanced general civilizing and 
utilitarian benefits of capitalist development for the sake of the colonized.62   
The important point for our purposes here is the deeply imbricated co-
formation of European expansionism and imperialism; liberal notions of 
humanity, reason, autonomy, freedom, and rights; and the construction of 
racial definition and discourse.63  John Locke, who served as a colonial 
administrator like Mill, established the notion that the right to property is as 
basic as the rights to life and liberty.  The context of the emergent Western 
social and political system, however, permits taking this right to entail a 
right to property in another human being.64  In this way, the liberalism of 
the modern state, which implied the freedom to enslave others, was crucial 
to European overseas expansion.65  
The ideology of individualism and the rights-bearing subject, therefore, 
needs closer scrutiny as a significant factor in the European will to 
conquer.66  The Western legal tradition emerging from this history of 
conquest conceives of a right as the conjunction of the freedom to do 
whatever one chooses and the claim to be protected from interference by 
others (whether individual, group, or state) in so doing.67  This individual 
capacity is translated as a universal power for the subject to act positively to 
secure his or her needs, and thus to preempt interference, when in fact it is a 
highly contingent power, resting in part upon the context of conquest.68  
The commitment to the rights-conception of the individual emergent in 
Western culture reveals an intrinsic conflict that is most clearly played out 
in racial terms.  The right of each individual to unobstructed self-direction 
and self-rule creates a clash of directions and rules as each individual seeks 
to assert and impose the inviolability of their rights.69  This individualist 
calculus produces a zero-sum game whereby the rights of some will 
inevitably mean the denial of another’s rights.  As French postmodern 
philosopher Michel Foucault explains, a “right should be viewed . . . not in 
terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the subjugation that 
it instigates.”70   
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In a society formed indelibly through racial conquest, the rights of those 
included will be understood as inviolable primarily by misrecognizing the 
rights of the excluded as irrelevant.  Liberalism’s emphasis on equality and 
universality, however, renders the racial specification of this exclusion in 
other terms: “just” wars, paternalistic colonialism, civilization, “the march 
of progress,” “manifest destiny,” and the savage or childlike nature of the 
enslaved.  The champions of individual liberty emerged from Europe to 
seek their freedom through the enslavement of others.  This point is the crux 
of the matter when the Western ideology of individualism is concerned: any 
pursuit of emancipation or freedom is curbed at precisely the moment where 
self-consciousness picks up.  When the Western subject begins to imagine 
himself or herself as “free,” he or she inevitably does so through an implicit 
understanding of the control over or un-freedom of another.71   
In other words, Western culture, with liberalism’s emphasis on individual 
rights and autonomy, emerges through Western Europe’s clash with Africa 
and the Americas, not prior to, or simply as a result of, this conquest.  In 
this way the very notion of what it means to be “free,” to possess liberty, is 
dependent upon an understanding of un-freedom and knowing which 
subjects not only are incapable of possessing themselves, but are, moreover, 
justly acquired and used by others.  Throughout the epistemology of 
Western culture, race is the recurring boundary line between those subjects 
understood to be human and those humans whose existence was denied.72  
In this way, Western notions of freedom, liberty, individual rights, and 
property are all profoundly bound up with the enslavement of the racialized 
Other. 
If Western notions of freedom necessarily require the enslavement of 
others, another critical question emerges: Why was slavery reserved 
exclusively for non-Europeans, and most particularly, for Africans?  Why 
were Europeans not used for slave labor?  European history is replete with 
the practice of labor coercion—the demonstrated willingness by European 
elites to kill, use, and persecute lower classes and minority groups; and the 
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disposition to deprive people of liberty and conscripting their labor as 
punishment for behaviors constructed as criminal.  All of this social 
violence makes it appear arbitrary to draw the line at enslavement.73  
Moreover, European societies have long-standing practices of internal 
racialism and of deploying differences to organize hierarchies.74  Despite 
the fact that it would have been much more profitable to enslave fellow 
Europeans, there is no evidence that Europeans ever considered instituting 
full chattel slavery of Europeans in their overseas settlements.  The decision 
to enslave Africans was as unthinking as it was a matter of course to not 
enslave Europeans.75  After the eleventh century, at least, a civilization 
ingrained in racialism ultimately found that its formative internal 
differences were not different enough to enslave.76   
The “brave New World,” built through the transmutation of Africa, was 
begun by approaching a particular body (the black) with direct relations of 
force (slavery).77  This conception of the modern era contrasts with that of 
liberal historiography in which modernity is marked by the rise of the 
bourgeois nation-state and the struggles of white citizen-subjects for 
membership and political representation.78  It also contrasts with Marxist 
historiography, which understands the dawn of the modern era to be the 
struggles between a white body and variable capital (waged relations).79  
The slave is the very condition of possibility not only for capitalism and the 
success of Enlightenment notions of the civilized, rational, and unraced 
subject; it is also the foundation on which legal discourse arises.  Our 
purpose here is to relocate rights as the result of a “fatal coupling of power 
and knowledge.”80  What rights blacks have, or how best to mobilize them, 
are juridical debates that participate in a larger deception.  The very concept 
of a right presupposes something that blacks historically have never had 
since the dawn of Western modernity—sovereignty over their own bodies. 
The Atlantic slave trade was a profound historical rupture, fundamentally 
degrading the personality of black human beings, all the while obsessing 
over black flesh.81  In the very processes employed to produce the body of 
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the African slave for consumption and use in the global libidinous system of 
racial capitalism, slavery bestows visibility on the structure and enormity of 
what is usually private and incommunicable, contained within the 
boundaries of the bodies of those who suffer pain.  At its base, slavery 
achieves the conversion of absolute pain into the fiction of absolute power 
in an obsessive, self-conscious, fetishistic, and parasitic display of agency.82  
For this reason, the procedures essential to the history of racial slavery and 
its pernicious afterlife have not been its brutal regime of labor exploitation 
nor its utility to the advent and maturation of Eurocentric capitalism.  
Rather, slavery is enabled by, and dependent upon, the most basic of 
operations: “symbolic and material immobilization, the absolute divestment 
of sovereignty at the site of the black body: its freedom of movement, its 
conditions of labor, its physical and emotional sustenance, its social and 
sexual reproduction, its political and cultural representation.”83  The legacy 
of slavery that continues to impress itself upon our social, psychic, and legal 
structures into the twenty-first century, bears this imprint of bodily 
dispossession and aggrandizement.  
To put it another way, we are working from a definition of slavery that is 
grounded in an analysis of what the practice signals about the symbolic 
universe and how physical bodies are constructed in relationship to each 
other.  White supremacy’s reliance upon black dehumanization means that 
enslavement of Africans was never reducible to mere economic logic.  
White violence against the black body was compelled by a complex mixture 
of conscious identification, unconscious fears, and subconscious longings.84  
Loss of one’s own body signals capture by direct relations of force.  As a 
captive entity, fixed in an undynamic state, “subject to be mortgaged, 
according to the rules prescribed by law,”85 the slave did not enter into a 
transaction of value.  In this way, slavery was a social death; this is what it 
means to say that slaves did not exist as human beings.86  The ethos of 
slavery that we are pointing to is an economy of desire in which value is 
produced.  However, because value works by mystifying its very processes 
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of determining values, the worth of white and black bodies appears natural, 
rather than as the result of violent encounters.87  The symbolic economy of 
slavery is more fundamental to its existence than is the political economy.  
In other words, the constituent elements of slavery begin with desire for the 
symbols of purity, honor, and humanity represented by whiteness and made 
possible by blackness and for the pleasure, exoticism, and self-loathing 
epitomized by blackness as constructed in opposition to whiteness.  In 
addition to the surplus value produced from their labor, the accumulation of 
black bodies generated a symbolic economy in which slaves were valuable 
simply for the fact that they existed as things for the satisfaction of the 
whims of the captor.88  It is for this reason that the work performed by black 
slaves is historically significant, but it was not the primary reason for the 
slaves’ (non)being.  In the constellation of values that white supremacy 
establishes, bourgeois democracy mystifies the value of black bodies.  As 
Cornel West puts it: 
[White supremacy] dictates the limits of the operation of American 
democracy—with black folk the indispensable sacrificial lamb 
vital to its sustenance.  Hence black subordination constitutes the 
necessary condition for the flourishing of American democracy, 
the tragic prerequisite for America itself.  This is, in part, what 
Richard Wright meant when he noted, “The Negro is America’s 
metaphor.”89 
To state it more pointedly, black death provides the very conditions of 
possibility for white life.90  This point is not hyperbole or melodrama; it is 
drawn from an analysis of the discursive structure of slavery and the 
material realities it calls into being.  Slave codes in the southern United 
States demanded that slaves receive clothing, food, and lodging sufficient to 
their basic needs.  Slaves, although dead to rights and responsibilities—civil 
death—were reduced to nothing but the physical bodies, unprotected 
against capture, mutilation, and torture.  
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II. JENA AND THE ETHICS OF FRAUD 
 
In the United States, homegrown white supremacists, and the 
lion’s share of their more moderate neighbors, have long 
considered black people to be weapons of mass destruction. 
           —Jared Sexton 
 
In his famed masterpiece The Souls of Black Folks, W. E. B. Du Bois 
expresses contempt for the legal vestiges of slavery.  He opined that the 
slave experience caused “[n]egroes . . . to look upon courts as instruments 
of injustice and oppression, and upon those convicted in them as martyrs 
and victims.”91  We need to think through Jena, too, in terms of the manner 
in which slave codes during the antebellum period constructed a universe of 
fraudulent morality, which continues to be perpetuated in two ways.  First, 
in asserting the rule of law, white society shrouds the conditions of violent 
domination behind the myth of consent.  The slave is presumed to give his 
or her consent to being dominated as a consequence of his or her utter 
powerlessness, or perfect subjugation.  Second, slavery has such an 
extensive legal history precisely because the slave so frequently violated 
these terms, resisting the absolute authority of white civil society.   
Much of the discursive order of slavery was preoccupied with how to 
mark the black body as socially dead and therefore as existing beyond the 
penumbra of legal rights and responsibilities.  Simply put, the law decreed 
that the black body is a fraud.  To be a fraudulent person is to impersonate a 
human being.  There is only one such position in the ontology of the 
modern Western world and it belongs to the black.  The lasting ideological 
and affective matrix of white supremacy admits no legitimate claims of 
black self-possession, self-determination, or autonomy in the face of white 
society’s desire to possess, consume, and enjoy the captive body of blacks.  
This ethos of slavery is far more central to understanding violence against 
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the black body than simply the immiserated conditions (including “disparate 
treatment” by the state and civil society) that blacks share with other people 
of color, workers, and the poor generally under global corporate capitalism. 
A number of legal decisions demonstrate the violence of this fraudulent 
ethic.  In State of Missouri v. Celia, a Slave,92 Celia was prosecuted for the 
murder of her owner, who had been raping her regularly in the four years 
since he purchased her.  Celia was convicted and sentenced to death by 
hanging.  How could a slave be tried for murder?  Is not murder a human 
act, something requiring agency and a reasoning subjectivity, a mind 
capable of forming intention and a will to carry out that intent?93  By 
definition, slavery is the absence of these qualities.  The court recognized 
Celia as human, however, solely in the context of criminal liability: the 
slave’s will was acknowledged only as it was prohibited or punished.94  The 
criminality imputed to Celia disavowed the banal terror of white violence 
and its instrumentality in state power.  The slave woman could neither give 
nor refuse consent to sex, nor could she offer reasonable resistance to being 
raped.  In the trial record, the history of rape is only obliquely 
acknowledged as “sexual intercourse.”  From the perspective of the law, 
Celia’s body represents the vested interests of others, rather than the vessel 
of an intrinsic human agency; black criminality was thus a necessary 
response by the state to this threatening agency of blackness.95   
Numerous additional cases prove that Missouri v. Celia was typical rather 
than anomalous.  More importantly, extensive archival evidence from slave 
narratives exemplifies the routine terror of sexual and other forms of 
physical and psychological violence under slavery.96  The law, on the other 
hand, records state terrorism (slavery) in terms that mask the violence 
necessary for its operation.  In Alfred v. State, Alfred, a slave, was 
sentenced to death for murdering the overseer who raped the slave’s wife, 
Charlotte.97  When the defense sought to have Charlotte testify on behalf of 
her husband, the prosecution objected.  The court sustained the objection on 
the grounds that Charlotte’s relation to Alfred (that of a wife and her 
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husband) had no legal status; the denial of marital relation, in turn, negated 
the violence that had precipitated Alfred’s act of murder.   
The law’s repression of state violence transmogrifies Charlotte’s rape 
into mere “adultery” and Alfred’s act into “outrages of conjugal affections.”  
As in Missouri v. Celia, the Alfred court endorses the indiscriminate use of 
the slave body for pleasure, profit, and punishment.  As A. Leon 
Higginbotham comments, the Missouri court “held that the end of slavery is 
not merely ‘the [economic] profit of the master’ but also the joy of the 
master in the sexual conquest of the slave.”98  The normativity of rape that 
derives from the violence of the law is also produced through the law’s 
refusal to recognize any legitimate social relations among the enslaved.  
Bodily dispossession and its fungibility for white civil society are enabled 
by constructing the black body as a “genealogical isolate”—a being 
disconnected from both ancestors and progeny. 99  Slavery achieves this 
rupture by outlawing African cultural expression; by proscribing 
parenthood, principally through the separation of children from their 
“parents”; and through the master’s property interest in the female 
reproductive body.100  In this way, the slave is bound only to the human 
realm through property relations. 
The famous North Carolina Supreme Court decision State v. Mann 
demonstrates how the law simultaneously manifests this fraudulent ethic 
and represents a significant terrain on which the obvious contradictions are 
managed.  Mann was indicted for assault and battery upon Lydia, a slave 
whom he had hired for a year from another slave owner, Elizabeth Jones.  
“During the term, the slave had committed some small offence, for which 
the Defendant undertook to chastise her—that while in the act of so doing, 
the slave ran off, whereupon the Defendant called upon her to stop, which 
being refused, he shot and wounded her.”101  The lower court convicted 
Mann, finding him guilty of “cruel and unwarrantable punishment, and 
disproportionate to the offense committed by the slave.”102  In overturning 
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the conviction, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized 
that the slave had 
no will of his own [and he must surrender] his will in implicit 
obedience to that of another.  Such obedience is the consequence 
of uncontrolled authority over the body.  There is nothing else that 
can operate to produce the effect.  The power of the master must be 
absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect.103 
The Court held that this absolute power was not a matter for legal debate 
and that the purpose of the slave codes was to convince each slave that 
“there is no remedy” for injury at the hands of the master.104    
The Mann decision is significant in many respects.  It is certainly 
noteworthy for the bald language of power it deploys—the supreme 
authority it reserves for whites and the total surrender it requires from 
blacks.  We suggest, however, that the importance of the Mann decision lies 
with the cultural codes of white supremacy that the law draws upon and 
reaffirms.  The Mann court asserted that although the power of the master 
had to be absolute in order to render the “submission of the slave perfect,” 
“[a]s a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must 
repudiate it.  But in the actual condition of things it must be so.”105  Yet the 
harshness of this absolute power would be regulated not by legislative fiat 
or judicial restraint, but rather by “the private interest of the owner, the 
benevolence toward each other, seated in the hearts of those who have been 
born and bred together, the . . . deep execrations of the community upon the 
barbarian, who is guilty of excessive cruelty to his unprotected slave.”106  In 
other words, the naked brutality of the law was to be ameliorated by the 
feelings of benevolence and affection between master and slave.  The 
master was expected, out of the goodness of his heart, to care enough for 
the enslaved that he would not punish them too harshly.   
In cultural terms, this legal discourse is profoundly and fatally 
contradictory.  First, the notion that perfect submission—total and utter 
surrender of bodily sovereignty—is a fundamental ordering principle of the 
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society, to be policed by whatever violent means necessary, means that 
public order and “harmony” (to use the language of the Mann court) 
requires systemic state violence.  Second, this violence was understood to 
be regulated through an appeal to the morality of whites, rather than through 
legal or political bonds.  In this way, white civil society preserved a moral 
self-image on the one hand and established the prerogative for brutal 
violence on the other.   
In order to fully appreciate the cultural impact of this legal discourse, we 
should remind ourselves that the unwritten complement of slave law was 
the decriminalization of white violence that serves as the founding gesture 
of society.  In Commonwealth v. Turner, the Virginia court upheld the 
master’s right to extreme forms of punishment.  The only dissenting justice 
argued that a slave was entitled to protection as a person “except so far as 
the application of it conflicted with the enjoyment of the slave as a 
thing.”107  The coupling of tyranny with affection— absolute dominion with 
moral sensibility—established a fraudulent ethic in which the pleasures of 
parasitism were experienced as morality.  As we move our analysis towards 
the afterlife of slavery, the realm in which we now live, it is worth 
observing that this form of power becomes both increasingly tenuous and 
progressively more difficult to dislodge.  Whites continue to respond in 
personal and moral terms to challenges to the status quo; moving into the 
twenty-first century, assertions of racism and racial inequality are almost 
impossible to make without being consumed by personal affront or 
dissipated into an isolated case.  Power is effectively insulated by the 
personal subjectivities of those people (still mostly white but now 
increasingly other races as well) whose investments it represents and 
deposits in the social structures of this society.108 
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III. JENA AND THE ETHICS OF WHITE SOLIDARITY 
The power that centuries of slavery bequeath us is most clearly 
understood in terms of antiblackness.  The Western world structures itself 
according to an Aristotelian, binary logic of opposition.  This binary system 
of meaning works contextually by always placing any two terms as far from 
each other as possible; that which supposedly differentiates them constitutes 
the organizing principle for the schema.109  In other words, since the 
Western system works by placing positivity and establishing its self-identity 
on the value of the white, it structures its primary opposition—negativity—
on the level of the black.  To speak of racial opposition, then, is to reference 
an antiblack world in which two principles of value predominate: (1) it is 
best to be white, and (2) it is worst to be black.  Or, to put it in multiracial 
terms, it is best to be white, but when that fails, at least avoid being black at 
all costs. 
From the vantage of whiteness, this structure of logic is absolute.  It is 
Manichæan (Gnostic) in the sense that it presents the world as comprised of 
“objective” material good and evil: there are people who are materially 
good and others who are evil, not by virtue of their behaviors, but because 
of who or what they are.110  This divide does not produce a hierarchy of 
humanity; instead, it produces a finite schism between the realm of 
humanity (whites/Europe) and nonhumanity (blacks/Africa).  In a 
Manichæan world, the black can only achieve equality among blacks—a 
particular and degraded contextuality—while the white finds his or her 
reference in the universality of humanity.  
The Martinican anticolonialist Frantz Fanon wrote about how the modern 
world was formed first through sadistic aggression towards blacks (slavery 
and colonialism), a process which we have elaborated on in the sections 
above.  For Fanon, this sadistic aggression is structural because without it 
“white would not be white.”  But the official sanction against this violence 
in bourgeois democratic culture turns this structural violence into 
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impermissible knowledge—the knowledge of the necessity of black death 
for white life.  As we reviewed in the section above, slave law is deeply 
grounded in the fraudulent ethics of violence and denial.  This dual terror—
violence and denial—also reveals the double movement that is at the heart 
of legal discourse in the antiblack world.  In the post-Emancipation era, this 
ethic is reworked in a way that sutures the status of blacks as nonpersons to 
a rapidly changing legal landscape.  We suggest that the appearance of an 
increasingly liberal terrain with regards to racial violence and the law in fact 
obfuscates the ongoing reality of antiblackness.   
Formal emancipation of blacks from the social status of chattel was not a 
reality that whites could comprehend.  Consequently, whites reserved a 
special place in their imaginations for the formerly enslaved subjects.111  In 
this way, the dream of slavery lives on at the level of desire and 
identification, the cultural dimension in which we have said it was most 
operative all along.  Our analysis of slavery emphasized the symbolic 
economy precisely because it is this ethos that permits identifying slavery’s 
afterlife in the symbols and signs that organize our society in the twenty-
first century.  In other words, the culture of white supremacy, deeply 
embedded in the seminal concepts of Western society, means that whiteness 
remains dependent upon the accumulation of black bodies in new and more 
complex ways.  Two cultural codes took over from slavery: criminality and 
indebtedness.  Both of these figures mark the zone of nonhumanity, 
demonstrating how, in the post-Emancipation era, the law retrenched 
antiblackness by simultaneously acknowledging and nullifying black 
people’s new juridical status as free and equal citizens. 
The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment; the adoption of Black Codes; 
the institutions of convict leasing, sharecropping, and debt peonage; and the 
widespread practice of lynching together make up the complementary 
methods of recapturing the black body and suspending it in a state of 
permanent injury.  These methods also represent the material structures of 
the legal and economic systems that forge the discursive connection 
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between blackness and criminality and form the basis for understanding the 
contemporary paradigm of policing.  The Thirteenth Amendment 
simultaneously ended slavery in the generalized, formal sense and 
reconstituted it as the discrete point of reference for continued control over 
the freed people.112 
The Black Codes racialized specific crimes such that they created crimes 
for which only black people could be “duly convicted.”113  As a result, 
Southern prisons were transformed from largely white to almost exclusively 
black, clearly marking a historical shift in the method of white domination 
and punishment of blacks from slavery to imprisonment.114  As W.E.B. Du 
Bois explains in Black Reconstruction, there were no black convicts in the 
antebellum period since blacks were almost exclusively punished under the 
discipline of the plantation.  After the war, however, the “whole criminal 
system came to be used as a method of keeping Negroes at work and 
intimidating them.  Consequently there began to be a demand for jails and 
penitentiaries beyond the natural demand due to the rise of crime.”115  
These penitentiaries quickly swelled with black convicts.116   
This process contributed to the racialization of crime itself, with 
criminality imputed to blackness.  Frederick Douglass claimed that the 
tendency to “impute crime to color” meant that guilt was assigned to blacks 
as a group, regardless of the race of the perpetrator of a crime: 
In certain parts of our country, when any white man wishes to commit a 
heinous offence, he wisely resorts to burnt cork and blackens his face and 
goes forth under the similitude of a Negro.  When the deed is done, a little 
soap and water destroys his identity, and he goes unwhipt of justice.  Some 
Negro is at once suspected and brought before the victim of wrong for 
identification, and there is never much trouble here, for as in the eyes of 
many white people, all Negroes look alike, and as the man arrested and who 
sits in the dock in irons is black, he is undoubtedly the criminal.117 
Douglass’s point is a simple one: black criminality, like race itself, is 
premised upon the existence of a racial etiquette, where race becomes a 
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“common sense” way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the 
world.118  Over a century after Douglass wrote this analysis of the 
criminalization of blackness, Katheryn Russell documented case data for 
sixty-seven racial hoaxes perpetrated between 1987 and 1996, including the 
notorious cases of Charles Stuart, Susan Smith, and Jesse Anderson.119  
Russell noted that the majority of hoaxes involved whites who fabricated 
crimes against blacks; moreover, she noted that this data represents but a 
fraction of all racial hoax cases, since most hoaxes are not classified or 
reported as such.  The a priori criminalization of blackness is the necessary 
precursor to incarceration as a central tool of power over the black body.  In 
Douglass’s era, it made possible the spread of the convict lease system, in 
which black prisoners were leased as slaves to private industrialists or 
planters.  As numerous analysts have pointed out, the economic incentive to 
abuse prisoners, to literally use them up, actually made the experience of 
convict leasing “worse than slavery.”120  The Black Codes that permitted 
criminal prosecution of freed people who did not fulfill their job contracts 
meant that the threat of penal slavery served to enforce the conditions of 
debt servitude, in which black farmers found themselves trapped during the 
post-Emancipation period.  The prevailing legal and economic systems of 
the time—leasing, peonage, tenant farming, sharecropping, payment in 
scrip, racialized criminal law—mutually informed each other, and were 
determined by the ethos of slavery imbued into the criminal justice system, 
to produce a totalitarian effort at controlling the black body.121  In the 
present time, as in Douglass’s day, the criminalization of blackness and the 
racialization of crime support a policy of mass imprisonment that 
complements extant changes in the global political economy that deepen, 
rather than ameliorate, black subjugation.122 
Emancipation was thus fatally paradoxical: it brought both a rupture in 
slavery and a reorganization of the plantation society.  The antiblack world 
reconstructed the former slaves in terms of criminality in part because white 
society had so ritualistically cleansed its consciousness, via Emancipation, 
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of the systemic violence on which the society was based.  As we discussed 
in the section above, the fact that, under slavery, the slave’s humanity was 
denied—except for the purpose of criminal liability—points to the role of 
the law in the construction of antiblackness.  As ritualized in one legal 
moment after another, the privilege to act with impunity is reserved for 
whites, while blacks are blameworthy for those same actions.123   
In this way, the law participated in constructing the larger narrative about 
slavery as a benevolent institution, emphasizing the dependency and will-
less-ness of the slave and the paternalism of the master.  As Hartman has 
demonstrated in her work, within this narrative of the benign institution, the 
emancipated slave enters freedom beholden to benefactors, the former 
masters.124  If Africans were enslaved out of the moral responsibility of 
Europeans to civilize and protect blacks while benefiting from their labor as 
“beasts of burden,” then the horrors of slavery and its legacy fall on the 
shoulders of the freedperson.  As solely culpable for the violence of slavery 
and its aftermath, the freedperson is then cast as indebted to whites for 
freedom itself.  In this way, white supremacy absolves itself of its 
wrongdoings, thereby producing national innocence for the ongoing crimes 
of slavery.  The freedperson is also held liable by white civil society for the 
very violence that necessitated the bloody remaking of the nation-state.  The 
renewed forms of violent dispossession and premature death that the 
freedpersons encountered after Emancipation were thus seen as simply the 
burdens of freedom, the cross that the former slave must bear.125   
The specters of criminality and indebtedness thus ensnared blacks in the 
post–Emancipation era.  White supremacy holds the former slave personally 
responsible for her own victimization, all while the legal and economic 
institutions that replaced slavery dispossess her of sovereignty and self-
determination.  This paradoxical process produces the criminal through 
racially specific social and historical processes—and yet casts her as 
individually liable.  The shame and denigration this experience produces 
reflects the social devaluation of the criminal; in this context, we can see 
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how the experience of being socially dishonored and violated can manifest 
itself in violent behavior.   
Lynching remains the phenomenon from the Reconstruction era that 
provides the most paradigmatic illustration of how the phoenix of slavery 
rose from its legal ashes stronger than ever before.  Lynching is the 
archetype for contemporary techniques of antiblack policing for three 
primary reasons.  First, it provides cohesion for white civil society against 
the perceived threat of blackness, and enforces allegiance to white 
supremacy; second, gratuitous violence against black bodies is the language 
through which this solidarity is achieved; and third, it is the bridge between 
slavery and the contemporary prison industrial complex in terms of the 
impunity claimed by the police and white people’s prerogative to ignore this 
antiblack violence.   
We reject the notion that lynching was simply the expression of white 
civil society and not a form of state terror; the fact that it was not officially 
organized by the state is merely a technical point made persuasive by the 
hegemony of the law.126  On the other hand, we have been analyzing the 
law in terms of actions, not simply what is written in legislative statutes.  In 
this regard, then, the usual description of lynching as “extra-legal,” as in 
“not regulated or sanctioned by law,” has no purchase in our analysis.  To 
the contrary, lynching was, in keeping with American-style contradictions, 
simultaneously illegal and legal.  Torture, rape, and murder have always 
been illegal in this country, as have trial, conviction, and execution without 
due process.127  These practices have long been permissible against blacks, 
of course, but that underscores the point, rather than overrules it: black 
bodies have always and already been seized, searched, tried, and convicted.   
In our analysis, lynching is “legal” in two senses.  First, it is conducted 
by whites with impunity, often by law enforcement itself.  Second, lynching 
reveals the “law” of white supremacy governing U.S. society and 
mandating the bodily dispossession of all blacks in the face of white 
authority.  That lynching was a socially customary practice that ultimately 
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became legal is most clearly seen in the impunity with which lynch mobs 
operated; in how law enforcement would aid and abet the actions of the 
mobs; in the high rates of membership by local and federal law enforcement 
personnel in the Ku Klux Klan; and in the manner in which lynching was 
eventually contained (not eliminated).  Furthermore, the containment 
occurred through political pressure by the racial state on local elites who 
discouraged the practice amongst the white working class that did the heavy 
lifting of racial terror—not by means of prosecuting perpetrators or 
prohibiting the practice through legislative fiat.128   
Indeed, the fact that one of the most prominent manifestations of 
organized black resistance to racial rule during this era took the form of a 
campaign by black leaders for federal antilynching legislation supports our 
argument.  It is not that the antilynching campaign, led by Ida B. Wells-
Barnett and the NAACP, was not historically significant and did not 
produce important effects, because it achieved both of these things.129  
Rather, the point is that black opposition sought redress for injuries that 
were already simultaneously prohibited and permitted by law by petitioning 
the racial state for more law.  This paradoxical quality to white supremacy 
was, and remains, essential to its operation.  Although murder is illegal, the 
law permits, and indeed facilitates, white violence against blacks.  The need 
for a specific legal prohibition against lynching simply underscores the 
degree to which the law does not recognize black humanity.130  
The historical narrative of lynching as “extra-legal,” however, is most 
significant for what it tells us about lynching’s crucial role in producing 
white solidarity.  White society is rallied today through the amnesiac belief 
that lynching happened despite the law, not because of it.  In this way, the 
law continues to work to bring white people together at the expense of 
blacks—in this case, by discursively isolating racism from the domain of 
law.  This move is key to the contemporary culture of white supremacy and 
is most visible in terms of “color-blindness” ideology, an issue to which we 
will turn our attention momentarily.  Today’s public denial of lynching as 
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state terrorism recalls the ritualism that drove the practice historically.  The 
lynch mob was an extension of the slave patrols central to the slavocracy 
prior to Emancipation.131  In writing about the slave patrols, renowned 
author and progressive activist Steve Martinot provides us with a critical 
lens through which to discern the meaning of lynching to white people. 
[T]he patrols were more than merely a mode of policing.  On the 
one hand, their potential violence as a control mechanism 
engendered an ethos of impunity that expressed itself as terror in 
the face of their operations.  On the other, they appeared to the 
white population as the institution of peace and social tranquility.  
Terror and impunity toward black people constituted the 
materialization of white solidarity and tranquility, and white 
consensus in solidarity constituted the product of terror and 
impunity.132 
Lynching, too, produced social cohesion out of terrorism.  The violence 
generated allegiance to white supremacy by conjuring the specter of social 
disorder; in so doing it indulged the parasitic fantasies of white society.  In 
this way, lynching was instrumental in reproducing the culture of slavery 
after its official demise.  Lynchings were public rituals that literally created 
white communal spaces: torture and killing of black people provided one of 
the few occasions when the class divisions of white society were overcome.   
Between 1882 and 1946, there were at least five thousand recorded 
lynchings in the United States, almost one every three days (in February 
1893, there was practically one lynching per day).133  Nonetheless, this 
figure only just begins to embody the violence directed against black 
communities.  White mobs attacked blacks throughout the country during 
this period, leading to numerous race riots and thousands of deaths.134  In 
all cases, this violence against black people has been gratuitous: although 
the pretexts for this violence varied—fictional black rapists,135 revenge for 
perceived affronts to white superiority,136 competition over jobs,137 and 
suppression of black voting rights,138 to name a few—it was all in response 
to nothing but black existence.139  In the realm of white mob violence, the 
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law as legal discourse and disciplinary practice subtends the symbolic 
arena; in this regard, lynching teaches us that policing is profoundly 
psychological, reinforcing the authority of white power.140  In lynching, 
then, we see the constituent elements of modern policing: impunity, 
solidarity, terror, and public bodies fungible for white civic pleasure.  Since 
a basic indicator of social parasitism is when one group’s pain is another 
group’s pleasure, we should recall the words of Richard Wright and Cornel 
West, cited earlier: black death provides the very conditions of possibility 
for white life.141 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHITES ON THE LOOSE 
With regard to the Jena case, this combined ethic of parasitism, fraud, 
and white solidarity—fundamental to white supremacy and deeply 
engrained in U.S. culture—continues to inform the intrinsic political and 
psychological structures of this society.  In Jena, the hanging of the nooses 
was widely dismissed by whites as a youthful prank, akin to putting toilet 
paper on a person’s front yard or shaving cream on a car.142  Although the 
high school principal wanted to expel the three youth, the school’s 
superintendent reduced their charges on the basis that their prank was 
nothing more than a tasteless joke.  Their reward for such parasitic violence 
was simple: after three days suspension, they were back at school.  Barbara 
Murphy, a white resident of Jena, expressed the viewpoint of much of the 
white community that saw no connection between the nooses and racial 
hatred, nor between racism and the criminal charges against the six black 
students:   
We don’t have a race problem.  It’s not black against white.  It’s crime.  
The nooses?  I don’t even know why they were there, what they were 
supposed to mean.  There’s pranks all the time, of one type or another, 
going on.  And it just didn’t seem to be racist to me.143   
Racial violence, of course, is rarely recognized as such by the persecuting 
society.  In the contemporary period, the parasitic relation between white 
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and black, “with black folk the indispensable sacrificial lamb”144 vital for 
the sustenance of white civil society, is strictly impermissible knowledge.145  
This denial on the part of whites is not merely psychological or cultural—it 
is structural.  In the post-civil rights era of formal legal equality, the State’s 
official policy of colorblindness146 would evaporate as so much hot air were 
it not for white people, en masse, disavowing the continued centrality of 
racism.   
Black people in Jena, of course, read the racist violence inherent in the 
hanging nooses.  Robert Bailey, one of the Jena Six, illuminates the 
parasitism represented by the nooses: 
It was in the early morning.  I seen them hanging.  I’m thinking 
the KKK, you know, were hanging nooses.  They want to hang 
somebody.  Real nooses, the ones you see on TV are the kind of 
nooses they were, the ones they play in the movies and they were 
hanging all the people, you know, and the thing dropped, those 
were the kind of nooses they were.  I know it was somebody white 
that hung the nooses in the tree.  You know, I don’t know another 
way to put it, but, you know, I was disappointed, because, you 
know, we do little pranks—you know, toilet paper, that’s a prank, 
you know what I’m saying?  Paper all over the square, all the 
pranks they used to do, that’s pranks.  Nooses hanging there—
nooses ain’t no prank.147 
Caseptla Bailey, Robert’s mother, specifically addressed how the 
violence of the message is connected to actual violence against black 
bodies: 
It meant hatred, to the other race.  It meant that “We’re going to 
kill you, you’re going to die.”  You know, it sent a message: “This 
is not the place for you to sit.  This is not your damn tree.  Do not 
sit here.  You know, you ought to remain in your place, know your 
place and stay in your place.  You’re out of your boundaries.”  And 
the first thing now that the sheriff department or that the chief of 
police want to say that—as well as the superintendent—one had 
nothing to do with the other.  Now, come on now!148 
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As Caseptla Bailey so clearly puts it, black bodily dispossession remains 
a reality today; raw life is still the mark of the age.  This pilfering of black 
sovereignty is literally a source of white entertainment.  The June 1998 
lynching of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, by three white men who dragged 
Byrd from the back of their pickup truck for miles until his head separated 
from his body, not only underscores in horrific fashion Bailey’s assessment 
of the violence faced by blacks in Jena, but provided the occasion to see 
white people having fun.  Within a week of Byrd’s murder, there were 
reports of copycat crimes: in Louisiana, three white men taunted a black 
man with racial epithets while trying to drag him alongside their car; in 
Illinois, three white boys assaulted a black teenager in almost exactly the 
same way; in New York City three months later, where police officers and 
firefighters parodied Byrd’s lynching by imitating it in a Labor Day parade 
float; and in Washington, D.C., while Byrd’s killers were under trial, a radio 
announcer responded to a clip from a song by Lauryn Hill by commenting, 
“No wonder people drag them behind trucks.”149  Jokes and mimicry 
surround incidents of racial violence in ways that confound 
representation.150  It also shows how the distance of time and space do little 
to hinder the pedagogy of racial violence from reproducing its lessons.   
The Jena Six case itself occasioned its own period of mimicry.  In 
November 2007, the New York Times reported that since the huge 
September twentieth rally in Jena, where tens of thousands protested racism 
in the criminal justice system, there have been as many as fifty to sixty 
“noose incidents.”151  That same month, hundreds of people gathered in 
Charleston, West Virginia, to call for hate-crime charges in the case of 
Megan Williams, a young black woman who was beaten, tortured, and 
sexually assaulted for days in a remote trailer by six white people.152  Paul 
Vitello, writing in the New York Times, questioned whether these hate 
crimes were “part of some new homegrown vernacular of race hate.”153   
It seems more likely, however, that incidents such as the Jena Six case (or 
the murder of James Byrd) give permission to others to express in a more 
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dramatic fashion what is already alive and well at the level of the banal and 
everyday.  We occasion this permitted conduct not to a new form of race 
hate, as Vitello suggests, but to an extension of a racially ordinary past in 
legal memory.  In other words, what matters is not the new social terrain 
upon which we confront the racial disposition of the black body today, but 
instead, the manner in which we have failed to establish a legal system that 
could remove black punishment from its racial safekeeping.  Chester Himes 
once wrote that “yesterday will make you cry.”154  We would add that 
tomorrow will bring tears as well, since yesterday continues to shape the 
psychological, social, legal, and political structures of our society.  This is 
one of the many lessons available to us through the Jena Six. 
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